Research

I am interested in all kinds of concepts and relations that can be explored with nodes and arrows in graphical causal and probabilistic models such as causation, intervention, policy, grounding, mechanisms, constitution, supervenience, emergence, multiple realizability, reduction, representation, explanation, prediction, confirmation, unification, inference, abduction, analogy, disposition, belief, knowledge, action, free will, (in)determinism, and time. In my spare time, that is when I am not doing philosophy, I like to have fun with arrows too.

Below you find a list of my publications together with abstracts and links to the full papers and draft versions.

Books

[b.1] Causal nets, interventionism, and mechanisms: Philosophical foundations and applications
Synthese Library
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    This monograph looks at causal nets from a philosophical point of view. The author shows that one can build a general philosophical theory of causation on the basis of the causal nets framework that can be fruitfully used to shed new light on philosophical issues. Coverage includes both a theoretical as well as application-oriented approach to the subject.
    The author first counters David Hume’s challenge about whether causation is something ontologically real. The idea behind this is that good metaphysical concepts should behave analogously to good theoretical concepts in scientific theories. In the process, the author offers support for the theory of causal nets as indeed being a correct theory of causation.
    Next, the book offers an application-oriented approach to the subject. The author shows that causal nets can investigate philosophical issues related to causation. He does this by means of two exemplary applications. The first consists of an evaluation of Jim Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation. The second offers a contribution to the new mechanist debate.
    Introductory chapters outline all the formal basics required. This helps make the book useful for those who are not familiar with causal nets, but interested in causation or in tools for the investigation of philosophical issues related to causation.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2017). Causal nets, interventionism, and mechanisms: Philosophical foundations and applications. Synthese Library 381. Cham: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-49908-6

Peer-Reviewed Articles

[a.29] Unification and explanation from a causal perspective
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    We discuss two influential views of unification: mutual information unification (MIU) and common origin unification (COU). We propose a simple probabilistic measure for COU and compare it with Myrvold’s (2003, 2017) probabilistic measure for MIU. We then explore how well these two measures perform in simple causal settings. After highlighting several deficiencies, we propose causal constraints for both measures. A comparison with explanatory power shows that the causal version of COU is one step ahead in simple causal settings. However, slightly increasing the complexity of the underlying causal structure shows that both measures can easily disagree with explanatory power. The upshot of this is that even sophisticated causally constrained measures for unification ultimately fail to track explanatory relevance. This shows that unification and explanation are not as closely related as many philosophers thought.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. & Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J. (forthcoming). Unification and explanation from a causal perspective. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.

[a.28] Causal Bayes nets and token-causation: Closing the gap between token-level and type-level
Erkenntnis
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Causal Bayes nets (CBNs) provide one of the most powerful tools for modelling coarse-grained type-level causal structure. As in other fields (e.g., thermodynamics) the question arises how such coarse-grained characterisations are related to the characterisation of their underlying structure (in this case: token-level causal relations). Answering this question meets what is called a “coherence-requirement” in the reduction debate: How are different accounts of one and the same system (or kind of system) related to each other. We argue that CBNs as tools for type-level causal inference are abstract enough to roughly fit any current token-level theory of causation as long as certain modelling assumptions are satisfied, but accounts of actual causation, i.e. accounts that attempt to infer token-causation based on CBNs, for the very same reason, face certain limitations.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. & Hüttemann, A. (forthcoming). Causal Bayes nets and token-causation: Closing the gap between token-level and type-level. Erkenntnis.

[a.27] A causal Bayes net analysis of Glennan’s mechanistic account of higher-level causation (and some consequences)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    One of Stuart Glennan’s most prominent contributions to the new mechanist debate consists in his reductive analysis of higher-level causation in terms of mechanisms (Glennan, 1996). In this paper I employ the causal Bayes net framework to reconstruct his analysis. This allows for specifying general assumptions which have to be satis ed to get Glennan’s approach working. I show that once these assumptions are in place, they imply (against the background of the causal Bayes net machinery) that higher-level causation indeed reduces to interactions between component parts of mechanisms. I also briefly discuss the plausibility of these assumptions and some consequences for the mechanism debate.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2022). A causal Bayes net analysis of Glennan’s mechanistic account of higher-level causation (and some consequences). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 73(1), 185-210. doi:10.1093/bjps/axz034

[a.26] Free will, control, and the possibility to do otherwise from a causal modeler’s perspective
Erkenntnis
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Strong notions of free will are closely connected to the possibility to do otherwise as well as to an agent’s ability to causally influence her environment via her decisions controlling her actions. In this paper we employ techniques from the causal modeling literature to investigate whether a notion of free will subscribing to one or both of these requirements is compatible with naturalistic views of the world such as non-reductive physicalism to the background of determinism and indeterminism. We argue that from a causal modeler’s perspective the only possibility to get both requirements consists in subscribing to reductive physicalism and indeterminism.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., Sekatskaya, M., & Schurz, G. (2022). Free will, control, and the possibility to do otherwise from a causal modeler’s perspective. Erkenntnis, 87(4), 1889-1906. doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00281-w

[a.25] The causal theory of knowledge revisited: An interventionist approach
Ratio
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Goldman (1967) proposed that a subject s knows p if and only if p is appropriately causally connected to s’s believing p. He later on abandoned this theory (Goldman, 1976). The main objection to the theory is that the causal connection required by Goldman is compatible with certain problematic forms of luck. In this paper we argue that Goldman’s causal theory of knowledge can overcome the luck problem if causation is understood along interventionist lines. We also show that the modified theory leads to the correct results in contexts involving other prominent forms of epistemic luck and compare it with other accounts on the market.
Citation Information
    de Grefte, J., & Gebharter, A. (2021). The causal theory of knowledge revisited: An interventionist approach. Ratio, 34(3), 193-202. doi:10.1111/rati.12304

[a.24] Quantifying proportionality and the limits of higher-level causation and explanation
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Supporters of the autonomy of higher-level causation (or explanation) often appeal to proportionality, arguing that higher-level causes are more proportional than their lower-level realizers. Recently, measures based on information theory and causal modeling have been proposed that allow to shed new light on proportionality and the related notion of specificity. In this paper we apply ideas from this literature to the issue of higher vs. lower-level causation (and explanation). Surprisingly, proportionality turns out to be irrelevant for the question of whether higher-level causes (or explanations) can be autonomous; specificity is a much more informative notion for this purpose.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Eronen, M. I. (2021). Quantifying proportionality and the limits of higher-level causation and explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Advance online publication. doi:10.1086/714818

[a.23] A causal Bayes net analysis of dispositions
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In this paper we develop an analysis of dispositions by means of causal Bayes nets. In particular, we analyze dispositions as cause-effect structures that increase the probability of the manifestation when the stimulus is brought about by intervention in certain circumstances. We then highlight several advantages of our analysis and how it can handle problems arising for classical analyses of dispositions such as masks, mimickers, and finks.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Fischer, F. (2021). A causal Bayes net analysis of dispositions. Synthese, 198(5), 4873-4895. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02374-8

[a.22] Combining causal Bayes nets and cellular automata: A hybrid modelling approach to mechanisms
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Causal Bayes nets (CBNs) can be used to model causal relationships up to whole mechanisms. Though modelling mechanisms with CBNs comes with many advantages, CBNs might fail to adequately represent some biological mechanisms because—as Kaiser (2016) pointed out—they have problems with capturing relevant spatial and structural information. In this paper we propose a hybrid approach for modelling mechanisms that combines CBNs and cellular automata. Our approach can incorporate spatial and structural information while, at the same time, it comes with all the merits of a CBN representation of mechanisms.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. & Koch, D. (2021). Combining causal Bayes nets and cellular automata: A hybrid modelling approach to mechanisms. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72(3), 839-864. doi:10.1093/bjps/axy049

[a.21] The role of source reliability in belief polarisation
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Psychological studies show that the beliefs of two agents in a hypothesis can diverge even if both agents receive the same evidence. This phenomenon of belief polarisation is often explained by invoking biased assimilation of evidence, where the agents’ prior views about the hypothesis affect the way they process the evidence. We suggest, using a Bayesian model, that even if such influence is excluded, belief polarisation can still arise by another mechanism. This alternative mechanism involves differen- tial weighting of the evidence arising when agents have different initial views about the reliability of their sources of evidence. We provide a systematic exploration of the conditions for belief polarisation in Bayesian models which incorporate opinions about source reliability, and we discuss some implications of our findings for the psychological literature.
Citation Information
    Henderson, L., & Gebharter, A. (2021). The role of source reliability in belief polarisation. Synthese, 199(3-4), 10253-10276. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03244-y

[a.20] Confirmation based on analogical inference: Bayes meets Jeffrey
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Certain hypotheses cannot be directly confirmed for theoretical, practical, or moral reasons. For some of these hypotheses, however, there might be a workaround: confirmation based on analogical reasoning. In this paper we take up Dardashti, Hartmann, Thébault, and Winsberg’s (in press) idea of analyzing confirmation based on analogical inference Baysian style. We identify three types of confirmation by analogy and show that Dardashti et al.’s approach can cover two of them. We then highlight possible problems with their model as a general approach to analogical inference and argue that these problems can be avoided by supplementing Bayesian update with Jeffrey conditionalization.
Citation Information
    Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., & Gebharter, A. (2020). Confirmation based on analogical inference: Bayes meets Jeffrey. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(2), 174-194. doi:10.1017/can.2019.18

[a.19] Free will as a higher-level phenomenon?
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    List (2014, 2019) has recently argued for a particular view of free will as a higher-level phenomenon compatible with determinism. According to List, one could refute his account by showing that determinism at the physical level implies the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level. This paper takes up that challenge. Based on assumptions to which List’s approach is committed, I provide a simple probabilistic model that establishes the connection between physical determinism and the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level that is needed to refute free will as a higher-level phenomenon.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2020). Free will as a higher-level phenomenon? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 9(3), 177-187. doi:10.1002/tht3.461

[a.18] A new proposal how to handle counterexamples to Markov causation a la Cartwright, or: Fixing the chemical factory
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Cartwright (1999a, 1999b) attacked the view that causal relations conform to the Markov condition by providing a counterexample in which a common cause does not screen off its effects: the prominent chemical factory. In this paper we suggest a new way to handle counterexamples to Markov causation such as the chemical factory. We argue that Cartwright’s as well as similar scenarios (such as decay processes, EPR/B experiments, or spontaneous macro breaking processes) feature a certain kind of non-causal dependence that kicks in once the common cause occurs. We then develop a representation of this specific kind of non-causal dependence that allows for modeling the problematic scenarios in such a way that the Markov condition is not violated anymore.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Retzlaff, N. (2020). A new proposal how to handle counterexamples to Markov causation a la Cartwright, or: Fixing the chemical factory. Synthese, 197(4), 1467-1486. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02014-7

[a.17] Modeling creative abduction Bayesian style
European Journal for Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Schurz (2008) proposed a justification of creative abduction on the basis of the Reichenbachian principle of the common cause. In this paper we take up the idea of combining creative abduction with causal principles and model instances of successful creative abduction within a Bayes net framework. We identify necessary conditions for such inferences and investigate their unificatory power. We also sketch several interesting applications of modeling creative abduction Bayesian style. In particular, we discuss use-novel predictions, confirmation, and the problem of underdetermination in the context of abductive inferences.
Citation Information
    Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., & Gebharter, A. (2019). Modeling creative abduction Bayesian style. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 9(1), 9. doi:10.1007/s13194-018-0234-4

[a.16] Establishing backward causation on empirical grounds: An interventionist approach
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    We propose an analysis of backward causation in terms of interventionism that can avoid several problems typically associated with backward causation. Its main advantage over other accounts is that it allows for reducing the problematic task of supporting backward causal claims to the unproblematic task of finding evidence for several ordinary forward directed causal hypotheses.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., Graemer, D., & Scheffels, F. H. (2019). Establishing backward causation on empirical grounds: An interventionist approach. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 8(2), 129-138. doi:10.1002/tht3.414

[a.15] Causal exclusion and causal Bayes nets
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward’s (2003) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2017). Causal exclusion and causal Bayes nets. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(2), 353-375. doi:10.1111/phpr.12247

[a.14] Causal exclusion without physical completeness and no overdetermination
Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Hitchcock (2012) demonstrated that the validity of causal exclusion arguments as well as the plausibility of several of their premises hinges on the specific theory of causation endorsed. In this paper I show that the validity of causal exclusion arguments if represented within the theory of causal Bayes nets the way Gebharter (2015) suggests actually requires much weaker premises than the ones which are typically assumed. In particular, neither completeness of the physical domain nor the no overdetermination assumption is required.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2017). Causal exclusion without physical completeness and no overdetermination. Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação, 10, 3-14.

[a.13] Uncovering constitutive relevance relations in mechanisms
Philosophical Studies
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In this paper I argue that constitutive relevance relations in mechanisms behave like a special kind of causal relation in at least one important respect: Under suitable circumstances constitutive relevance relations produce the Markov factorization. Based on this observation one may wonder whether standard methods for causal discovery could be fruitfully applied to uncover constitutive relevance relations. This paper is intended as a first step into this new area of philosophical research. I investigate to what extent the PC algorithm, originally developed for causal search, can be used for constitutive relevance discovery. I also discuss possible objections and certain limitations of a constitutive relevance discovery procedure based on PC.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2017). Uncovering constitutive relevance relations in mechanisms. Philosophical Studies, 174(11), 2645-2666. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0803-3

[a.12] A causal Bayesian network model of disease progression mechanisms in chronic myeloid leukemia
Journal of Theoretical Biology
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Chronic myeloid leukemia (CML) is a cancer of the hematopoietic system initiated by a single genetic mutation which results in the oncogenic fusion protein Bcr-Abl. Untreated, patients pass through different phases of the disease beginning with the rather asymptomatic chronic phase and ultimately culminating into blast crisis, an acute leukemia resembling phase with a very high mortality. Although many processes underlying the chronic phase are well understood, the exact mechanisms of disease progression to blast crisis are not yet revealed. In this paper we develop a mathematical model of CML based on causal Bayesian networks in order to study possible disease progression mechanisms. Our results indicate that an increase of Bcr-Abl levels alone is not sufficient to explain the phenotype of blast crisis and that secondary changes such as additional mutations are necessary to explain disease progression and the poor therapy response of patients in blast crisis.
Citation Information
    Koch, D., Eisinger, R., & Gebharter, A. (2017). A causal Bayesian network model of disease progression mechanisms in chronic myeloid leukemia. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 433, 94-105. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.08.023

[a.11] Constitutive relevance, mutual manipulability, and fat-handedness
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    The first part of this paper argues that if Craver’s ([2007a], [2007b]) popular mutual manipulability account (MM) of mechanistic constitution is embedded within Woodward’s ([2003]) interventionist theory of causation—for which it is explicitly designed—it either undermines the mechanistic research paradigm by entailing that there do not exist relationships of constitutive relevance or it gives rise to the unwanted consequence that constitution is a form of causation. The second part shows how Woodward’s theory can be adapted in such a way that (MM) neither undermines the mechanistic paradigm nor reduces constitution to causation. However, it turns out that this modified theoretical embedding of (MM) makes it impossible to produce empirical evidence for constitutive relations. The paper ends by suggesting an additional criterion, the fat-handedness criterion, which, when combined with (MM), generates indirect empirical evidence for constitutive relevance.
Citation Information
    Baumgartner, M., & Gebharter, A. (2016). Constitutive relevance, mutual manipulability, and fat-handedness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 67(3), 731-756. doi:10.1093/bjps/axv003

[a.10] Another problem with RBN models of mechanisms
Theoria — An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Casini, Illari, Russo, and Williamson (2011) suggest to model mechanisms by means of recursive Bayesian networks (RBNs) and Clarke, Leuridan, and Williamson (2014) extend their modelling approach to mechanisms featuring causal feedback. One of the main selling points of the RBN approach should be that it provides answers to questions concerning manipulation and control. In this paper I demonstrate that the method to compute the effects of interventions the authors mentioned endorse leads to absurd results under the additional assumption of faithfulness, which can be expected to hold for many RBN models of mechanisms.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2016). Another problem with RBN models of mechanisms. Theoria – An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 31(2), 177-188. doi:10.1387/theoria.14502

[a.9] A modeling approach for mechanisms featuring causal cycles
Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Mechanisms play an important role in many sciences when it comes to questions concerning explanation, prediction, and control. Answering such questions in a quantitative way requires a formal represention of mechanisms. Gebharter (2014) suggests to represent mechanisms by means of one or more causal arrows of an acyclic causal net. In this paper we show how this approach can be extended in such a way that it can also be fruitfully applied to mechanisms featuring causal feedback.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2016). A modelling approach for mechanisms featuring causal cycles. Philosophy of Science, 83(5), 934-945. doi:10.1086/687876

[a.8] Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    We start this paper by arguing that causality should, in analogy with force in Newtonian physics, be understood as a theoretical concept that is not explicated by a single definition, but by the axioms of a theory. Such an understanding of causality implicitly underlies the well-known theory of causal (Bayes) nets (TCN) and has been explicitly promoted by Glymour (Br J Philos Sci 55:779–790, 2004). In this paper we investigate the explanatory warrant and empirical content of TCN. We sketch how the assumption of directed cause-effect relations can be philosophically justified by an inference to the best explanation. We then ask whether the explanations provided by TCN are merely post-facto or have independently testable empirical content. To answer this question we develop a fine-grained axiomatization of TCN, including a distinction of different kinds of faithfulness. A number of theorems show that although the core axioms of TCN are empirically empty, extended versions of TCN have successively increasing empirical content.
Citation Information
    Schurz, G., & Gebharter, A. (2016). Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets. Synthese, 193(4), 1073–1103. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0630-z

[a.7] A formal framework for representing mechanisms?
Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In this paper I tackle the question of how mechanisms can be represented within a causal graph framework. I begin with a few words on mechanisms and some of their characteristic properties. I then concentrate on how one of these characteristic properties, viz. the hierarchic order of mechanisms (mechanisms frequently consist of several submechanisms), can be represented within a causal graph framework. I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Casini, Illari, Russo, & Williamson (2011) and demonstrate on an example that their formalism, though nicely capturing the hierarchic order of mechanisms, does not support two important features of nested mechanisms: (i) a mechanism’s submechanisms are typically causally interacting with other parts of said mechanism, and (ii) intervening in some of a mechanism’s parts should have some influence on the phenomena the mechanism as a whole brings about. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach capable of taking properties (i) and (ii) into account and demonstrate this on the above-mentioned exemplary mechanism.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2014). A formal framework for representing mechanisms? Philosophy of Science, 81(1), 138–153. doi:10.1086/674206

[a.6] Causal graphs and biological mechanisms
Explanation in the special sciences: The case of biology and history; Synthese Library
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Modeling mechanisms is central to the biological sciences – for purposes of explanation, prediction, extrapolation, and manipulation. A closer look at the philosophical literature reveals that mechanisms are predominantly modeled in a purely qualitative way. That is, mechanistic models are conceived of as representing how certain entities and activities are spatially and temporally organized so that they bring about the behavior of the mechanism in question. Although this adequately characterizes how mechanisms are represented in biology textbooks, contemporary biological research practice shows the need for quantitative, probabilistic models of mechanisms, too. In this paper we argue that the formal framework of causal graph theory is well-suited to provide us with models of biological mechanisms that incorporate quantitative and probabilistic information. On the basis of an example from contemporary biological practice, namely feedback regulation of fatty acid biosynthesis in Brassica napus, we show that causal graph theoretical models can account for feedback as well as for the multi-level character of mechanisms. However, we do not claim that causal graph theoretical representations of mechanisms are advantageous in all respects and should replace common qualitative models. Rather, we endorse the more balanced view that causal graph theoretical models of mechanisms are useful for some purposes, while being insufficient for others.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Kaiser M. I. (2014). Causal graphs and biological mechanisms. In M. I. Kaiser, O. Scholz, D. Plenge, & A. Hüttemann (Eds.), Explanation in the special sciences: The case of biology and history (pp. 55–85). Synthese Library 367. Dordrecht: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-7563-3_3

[a.5] How Occam’s razor provides a neat definition of direct causation
Proceedings of the UAI workshop Causal Inference: Learning and Prediction
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In this paper we show that the application of Occam’s razor to the theory of causal Bayes nets gives us a neat definition of direct causation. In particular we show that Occam’s razor implies Woodward’s (2003) definition of direct causation, provided suitable intervention variables exist and the causal Markov condition (CMC) is satisfied. We also show how Occam’s razor can account for direct causal relationships Woodward style when only stochastic intervention variables are available.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2014). How Occam’s razor provides a neat definition of direct causation. In J. M. Mooij, D. Janzing, J. Peters, T. Claassen, & A. Hyttinen (Eds.), Proceedings of the UAI workshop Causal Inference: Learning and Prediction. Retrieved from http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1274/uai2014ci_paper1.pdf

[a.4] Solving the flagpole problem
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In this paper I demonstrate that the causal structure of flagpole-like systems can be determined by application of causal graph theory. Additional information about the ordering of events in time or about how parameters of the systems of interest can be manipulated is not needed.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2013). Solving the flagpole problem. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 44(1), 63–67. doi:10.1007/s10838-013-9208-6

[a.3] The argument from hallucination in the light of modernformal philosophy
Tagungsband der Nachwuchstagungen fuer Junge Philosophie in Darmstadt
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    —
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Mirnig, A. G. (2011). The argument from hallucination in the light of modern formal philosophy. In S. Alpsancar, & K. Denker (Eds.), Tagungsband der Nachwuchstagungen fuer Junge Philosophie in Darmstadt (pp. 85–96). Marburg: Tectum.

[a.2] Disjunctivism: An answer to two pseudo problems?
Conceptus
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Ever since it was discovered that hallucinations and illusions are not all that compatible with our natural view of the relation between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, according to which we always perceive the object itself (or, as most epistemologists prefer to say, we perceive it directly), the philosophical position of Direct (or Naïve) Realism which is meant to be the epistemological equivalent of this view, has begun to falter. To express these problems more explicitly, the argument from hallucination and the argument from illusion were created and brought direct realists in dire need of explaining how phenomenons such as hallucinations and illusions could possibly go together with their position. One of the main direct (or naïve) realists’ responses to these arguments is Disjunctivism, a position that, while being able to efficiently deal with both arguments, is subject to quite a few problems in its postulations as well. The intuitive plausibility of both arguments seems to have led many a philosopher to take their validity for granted. Because of this, it will be attempted to give an accurate and adequate reformulation of both arguments in this paper to find out whether their impact on the philosophy of perception is justified in the first place.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Mirnig, A. G. (2010). Disjunctivism: An answer to two pseudo problems? Conceptus, 39(95), 61–84. doi:10.1515/cpt-2010-9503

[a.1] From a mereotopological point of view: Putting the scientific magnifying glass on Kant’s first antinomy
KRITERION — Journal of Philosophy
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant presents four antinomies. In his attempt to solve the first of these antinomies he examines and analyzes “thesis” and “antithesis” more thoroughly and employs the terms ‘part’, ‘whole’ and ‘boundary’ in his argumentation for their validity. According to Kant, the whole problem surrounding the antinomy was caused by applying the concept of the world to nature and then using both terms interchangeably. While interesting, this solution is still not that much more than a well thought out idea if it does not also include an adequate formal explication. Since the aforementioned terms all have counterparts in modern mereotopology, a discipline that has seen significant progress in recent times, we will apply these concepts to Kant’s analysis in an attempt to evaluate Kant’s solution in light of modern analytic philosophy.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Mirnig, A. G. (2010). From a mereotopological point of view: Putting the scientific magnifying glass on Kant’s first antinomy. KRITERION — Journal of Philosophy, 23(1), 64–85.

Edited Volumes

[e.6] Inductive metaphysics: Contemporary and historical issues
Grazer Philosophische Studien
[final publication] [draft version]

Contributions
    ● Kristina Engelhard, Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter, & Ansgar Seide: Inductive metaphysics: Editors’ introduction

    ● Amanda Bryant: Epistemic infrastructure for a scientific metaphysics

    ● Gerhard Schurz: Abduction as a method of inductive metaphysics

    ● Peter Simons: The long and winding road: Folly and feedback in metaphysics

    ● Ralf Busse: Against metaphysical structuralism: A case study on the apriori dimension within inductive metaphysics

    ● Matthew Tugby: Abduction and the scientific realist case for properties

    ● Kristina Engelhard: Methods and roles of experience in Christian Wolff’s “Deutsche Metaphysik”

    ● Arnauld Pelletier: Leibniz’s inductive challenge: First experiences and the metaphysics of monads

    ● Ansgar Seide: Analogical inference in Gustav Theodor Fechner’s inductive metaphysics

Citation Information
    Engelhard, K., Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., Gebharter, A., & Seide, A. (Eds.). (2021). Inductive metaphysics: Contemporary and historical issues [Special issue]. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 98(1)

[e.5] Logical perspectives on science and cognition
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Contributions
    ● Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter, Peter Brössel, & Markus Werning: Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition”

    ● Wolfgang Spohn: Defeasible Normative Reasoning

    ● Jonathan Evans & Shira Elqayam: How and Why we Reason from Is to Ought

    ● Ioannis Votsis: Theory-Ladenness: Testing the “Untestable”

    ● Alexander Gebharter & Nina Retzlaff: A new proposal how to handle counterexamples to Markov causation a la Cartwright, or: Fixing the chemical factory

    ● Andreas Hüttemann: Processes, pre-emption and further problems

    ● Ulrike Hahn, Jens Ulrik Hansen, & Erik Olsson: Truth Tracking Performance of Social Networks

    ● Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla: An Optimality-Argument for Equal Weighting

    ● Igor Douven: Scoring in Context

    ● Ilkka Niiniluoto: Truthlikeness: Old and new debates

    ● Theo Kuipers: Refined nomic truth approximation by revising models and postulates

    ● Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa: A partial consequence account of truthlikeness

    ● Elke Brendel: Truthmaker Maximalism and the Truthmaker Paradox

    ● Gerhard Schurz: Twelve great papers: Comments and replies

Citation Information
    Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., Gebharter, A., Brössel, P., & Werning, M. (Eds.). (2020). Logical perspectives on science and cognition [Special issue]. Synthese, 197(4).

[e.4] Selected papers of the second conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP), Düsseldorf, March 8–11, 2016
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Contributions
    ● Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter, & Gerhard Schurz: Philosophy of science between the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities

    ● Alexander Rosenberg: Why social science is biological science

    ● Gila Sher: Truth and scientific change

    ● Christian Wallmann: A Bayesian solution to the conflict of narrowness and precision in direct inference

    ● Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla: Optimization in a synchronized prediction Setting

    ● Alexander Christian: On the suppression of medical evidence

    ● Markus Schrenk: The emergence of better best system laws

    ● Carsten Held: Ceteris-paribus qualifiers

    ● Beate Krickel: Making sense of interlevel causation in mechanisms from a metaphysical perspective

    ● Stathis Psillos: Induction and natural necessities

Citation Information
    Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (Eds.). (2017). Selected papers of the second conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP), Düsseldorf, March 8–11, 2016 [Special issue]. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 48(3).

[e.3] Causation, probability, and truth — the philosophy of Clark Glymour
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Contributions
    ● Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz: Introduction to the special issue “Causation, probability, and truth – the philosophy of Clark Glymour”

    ● Jiji Zhang & Peter Spirtes: The three faces of faithfulness

    ● Frederick Eberhardt: Green and grue causal variables

    ● James Woodward: The problem of variable choice

    ● Gerhard Schurz & Alexander Gebharter: Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets

    ● Gerhard Schurz & Alexander Gebharter: Erratum to: Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets

    ● York Hagmayer: Causal Bayes nets as psychological theories of causal reasoning – evidence from psychological research

    ● Paul Näger: The causal problem of entanglement

    ● Christopher Hitchcock: Conditioning, intervening, and decision

    ● Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: Of brains and planets: On a causal criterion for mind-brain identities

    ● Kevin Kelly, Konstantin Genin, & Hanti Lin: Realism, rhetoric and reliability

    ● Sylvia Wenmackers & Jan-Willem Romeijn: New theory about old evidence: A framework for open-minded Bayesianism

    ● Clark Glymour: Clark Glymour’s responses to the contributions to the Synthese special issue “Causation, probability, and truth – the philosophy of Clark Glymour”

Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (Eds.). (2016). Causation, probability, and truth – the philosophy of Clark Glymour [Special issue]. Synthese, 193(4).

[e.2] Explanation, causality, and unification
Theoria — An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Contributions
    ● Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz: Editors’ introduction

    ● Stathis Psillos: Regularities, natural patterns and laws of nature

    ● Andreas Hüttemann: Scientific practice and necessary connections

    ● Erik Weber & Merel Lefevere: The role of explanations in micro-explanations of physical laws

    ● Gerhard Schurz: Unification and explanation: Explanation as a prototype concept. A reply to Weber and van Dyck, Gijsbers, and de Regt

    ● Victor Gijsbers: Unification as a measure of natural classification

Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (Eds.). (2014). Explanation, causality, and unification [Monographic section]. Theoria — An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 29(1), 3–82.

[e.1] Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2010
KRITERION — Journal of Philosophy
[final publication] [draft version]

Contributions
    ● The organization committee: Figures and facts

    ● Moritz Cordes: Rudolf Carnaps verschiedene Scheinproblemkonzeptionen

    ● Magdalena Eckes: Elektronen, Amseln, Finken. Wovon können unsere nicht-inferenziellen Beobachtungsüberzeugungen handeln?

    ● Ludwig J. Jaskolla: On storms in teacups: Limitations of 3D-4D-equivalence

    ● Max Seeger: A critique of the incentives argument from inequality

    ● Tim Seuchter: A new approach to the grounding of abstract concepts

    ● Christian Wallmann: Theorie der Konsequenzoperationen und Grundbegriffe der Logik

Citation Information
    Anglberger, A. J. J., Feldbacher, C. J., Gebharter, A., & Gugerell, S. H. (Eds.). (2011). Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2010 [Special issue]. KRITERION — Journal of Philosophy, 25(1).

Other Publications

[o.18] Introduction
Kriterion — Journal of Philosophy
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., & Gebharter, A. (2021). Introduction [Editorial]. Kriterion — Journal of Philosophy, 35(1), 1-4. doi:10.1515/krt-2021-0001

[o.17] Inductive metaphysics: Editors’ introduction
Grazer Philosophische Studien
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Engelhard, K., Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., Gebharter, A., & Seide, A. (2021). Inductive metaphysics: Editors’ introduction [Introduction]. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 98(1), 1-26. doi:10.1163/18756735-00000129

[o.16] Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition”
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., Gebharter, A., Brössel, B., & Werning, M. (2020). Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition” [Introduction]. Synthese, 197(4), 1381-390. doi:10.1007/s10838-016-9358-4

[o.15] The second international conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP.2016), 8–11 March 2016
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Christian, A., Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., & Gebharter, A. (2017). The second international conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP.2016), 8-11 March 2016 [Conference report]. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 48(2), 289–291. doi:10.1007/s10838-016-9358-4

[o.14] Philosophy of science between the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2017). Philosophy of science between the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities [Introduction]. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 48(3), 317–326. doi:10.1007/s10838-017-9378-8

[o.13] Spotlight on the Düsseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS)
EPSA Newsletter
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information

[o.12] Introduction to the special issue “Causation, probability,and truth — the philosophy of Clark Glymour”
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2016). Introduction to the special issue “Causation, probability, and truth — the philosophy of Clark Glymour” [Introduction]. Synthese, 193(4), 1007–1010. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-1007-7

[o.11] Erratum to: Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatorywarrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Schurz, G., & Gebharter, A. (2016). Erratum to: Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets [Erratum]. Synthese, 193(4), 1105–1106. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1019-y.

[o.10] European Philosophy of Science Association, 23–26 September
The Reasoner
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Christian, A., Feldbacher, C. J., Gebharter, A., & Retzlaff, N. (2015). European Philosophy of Science Association, 23-26 September [Conference report]. The Reasoner, 9(11), 95.

[o.9] Erratum to: Solving the flagpole problem
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2015). Erratum to: Solving the flagpole problem [Erratum]. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 46(2), 245. doi:10.1007/s10838-015-9311-y

[o.8] Addendum to: A formal framework for representing mechanisms?
PhilPapers.org
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information

[o.7] Editors’ introduction
Theoria — An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2014). Editors’ introduction [Introduction]. Theoria — An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 29(1), 5–7. doi:10.1387/theoria.10708

[o.6] Philosophy of science in Germany, 1992–2012: Survey-based overview and quantitative analysis
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    An overview of the German philosophy of science community is given for the years 1992 to 2012, based on a survey, at which 159 philosophers of science in Germany participated. To this end, the institutional background of the German philosophy of science community is examined in terms of journals, centers, and associations. Furthermore, a qualitative description and a quantitative analysis of our survey results are presented. Quantitative estimates are given for: (a) academic positions, (b) research foci, (c) philosophers’ of science most important publications, and (d) externally funded projects, where for (c) all survey participants had indicated their five most important publications in philosophy of science. In addition, the survey results for (a)-(c) are also qualitatively described, as they are interesting in their own right. With respect to (a), we estimated the gender distribution among academic positions. Concerning (c), we quantified philosophers’ of science preference for (i) journals and publishers, (ii) publication format, (iii) language, and (iv) coauthorship for their most important publications. With regard to research projects, we determined their (i) prevalence, (ii) length, and (iii) trend (an increase in number?) and well as their most frequent (iv) research foci and (v) funding organizations. We also distinguished between German-based and non-German-based journals, publishers, and funding institutions, making it thereby possible to evaluate the involvement of the German philosophy of science community in the international research landscape. Finally, we discuss some implications of our findings.
Citation Information
    Unterhuber, M., Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2014). Philosophy of science in Germany, 1992–2012: Survey-based overview and quantitative analysis. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 45(1, suppl.), 71–160. doi:10.1007/s10838-014-9270-8

[o.5] Wissenschaft und menschliche Werte
Werte in den Wissenschaften: Neue Ansätze zum Werturteilsstreit
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Hempel, C. G. (2013). Wissenschaft und menschliche Werte (A. Gebharter, Trans.). In G. Schurz, & M. Carrier (Eds.), Werte in den Wissenschaften: Neue Ansätze zum Werturteilsstreit (pp. 118–140). Berlin: Suhrkamp. (Original work published 1965).

[o.4] The philosophy of Clark Glymour, 13–15 June
The Reasoner
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Unterhuber, M., & Gebharter, A. (2013). The philosophy of Clark Glymour, 13–15 June [Conference report]. The Reasoner, 7(9), 109.

[o.3] Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2011
KRITERION — Journal of Philosophy
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Anglberger, A. J. J., Feldbacher, C. J., Gebharter, A., & Gugerell, S. H. (2012). Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2011 [Conference report]. KRITERION — Journal of Philosophy, 26(1), 104–109.

[o.2] For a better understanding of causality
Metascience
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2012). For a better understanding of causality [Review of the book Causality in the sciences, by P. M. K. Illari, F. Russo, & J. Williamson (Eds.)]. Metascience, 21(3), 643–648. doi:10.1007/s11016-012-9648-3

[o.1] Explanation, causality, and unification, 11–12 November
The Reasoner
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Schurz, G., & Gebharter, A. (2012). Explanation, causality, and unification, 11–12 November [Conference report]. The Reasoner, 6(1), 9–10.
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