Research


On this page you find short descriptions of some of my work, sorted by topics. Below these short descriptions you find a list of my publications. Numbers in descriptions refer to the corresponding publications in the list. To go directly to the list of my publications, klick here.


Causality as a Theoretical Concept

In classical philosophical theories causation is explicitly defined. Such theories are typically either reductionistic or they presuppose other causal concepts such as intervention or causal field. In [a.9] Gerhard Schurz and I propose another strategy to build a theory of causation. We suggest an axiomatization of the causal Bayes net framework in which causation works like a theoretical concept in modern empirical theories. In this theory, causation is only implicitly defined by the theory’s axioms and satisfies commonly accepted standards for good theoretical concepts: Causation can be backed up by an inference to the best explanation of two statistical phenomena. In addition, the theory as a whole generates novel predictions and has empirical content. It can, hence, be empirically tested. We think that the theory is a prime example of a part of a new empirically informed inductive metaphysics. In [b.1] I propose an axiomatization slightly different from the one Gerhard and I developed in [a.9]. I also provide a more detailed step by step justification of the theory’s core axiom.


Formal Representation of Mechanisms

Mechanisms play an important role for explanation and prediction in many sciences. Most descriptions of mechanisms that can be found in the literature are qualitative. In [a.6] I have, together with Marie Kaiser, investigated whether biological mechanisms can be quantitatively represented as input-output structures in causal graphs. We also compare quantitative versus qualitative representations of mechanisms. In [a.7] I have discussed a modeling approach for mechanisms proposed by Lorenzo Casini, Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo, and Jon Williamson. Though elegant, I think that their approach has several problems. Two of these problems are discussed in [a.7], the third one in [a.12]. I have then developed the multilevel causal modeling approach as an alternative in [a.7]. This approach represents nested mechanisms by means of causal arrows. In [a.10] I have further developed this approach together with Gerhard Schurz in such a way that it can also handle cyclic and dynamic systems. In [b.1] I defend my approach against recent objections put forward by Lorenzo. I also propose a way to represent constitutive relevance relation within multilevel causal models.


Constitutive Relevance and Constitutive Relevance Discovery

How causal structure can be inferred from observational or experimental data is nowadays quite well understood. It is, however, still not clear how one can account for or infer constitutive relevance relations in mechanisms. The most prominent approach to constitutive relevance currently on the market is probably Carl Craver’s mutual manipulability approach. This approach heavily relies on Jim Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation. Bert Leuridan has shown that mutual manipulability together with interventionism leads straightforward to the consequence that constitutive relevance is a form of causation. This is a consequence most mechanists would like to avoid. In [a.13] I have shown together with Michael Baumgartner that assuming that constitutive relevance is not a form of causation leads, together with Carl’s mutual manipulability criterion and Jim’s interventionism, to absurdities. We also proposed an alternative abductive approach to constitutive relevance. In [a.11] I propose still another way to go. [a.11] builds on an idea from [b.1] about how constitutive relevance could be represented within causal models. I then show how methods for causal search (such as the ones developed by Clark Glymour and his students) can be used to also uncover relationships of constitutive relevance. I also discuss possible violations of causal Markov and faithfulness in models of mechanisms.


The Causal Exclusion Problem

Chris Hitchcock has shown by means of the example of the causal exclusion problem that philosophical discussions involving causation may heavily depend on the specific theory of causation endorsed. In [a.8] I follow Chris’ insight and investigate the validity of two versions of the causal exclusion argument to the background of the theory of causal Bayes nets. This seems especially promising from an empirical point of view, since this specific theory seems to give us the best grasp on causation we have so far (see [a.9] and [b.1]). In [a.8] I show that both versions of the argument turn out to be valid, and in [a.15] that they actually require much weaker premises than typically needed for causal exclusion arguments. [a.8] also sheds new light on a recent debate of causal exclusion arguments within an interventionist theory of causation. Several philosophers (such as Jim Woodward, Lawrence Shapiro, and Elliot Sober) have argued that interventionist theories of causation support mental causation. In [a.8] I argue, however, that quite the contrary is the case. It can be shown that an assumption required for making sense of mental causation within interventionism can in no circumstances turn out to be true: For theoretical reasons it is not even possible to effectively intervene on variables supervening on other variables.


Interventionism and Causal Bayes Nets

Jim Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation is maybe the most prominent philosophical theory of causation currently available. Jiji Zhang and Peter Spirtes have shown that a version of an interventionist principle together with the causal Markov condition implies the causal minimality condition. In [a.5] I and Gerhard Schurz go the other way round and demonstrate that causal Markov together with minimality and suitable intervention variables implies a version of interventionism. In [b.1] I take a closer look at the relationship between Jim’s interventionist theory of causation and the theory of causal Bayes nets. I discuss conditions under which the different causal notions within these two theories coincide. I also highlight several problems with Jim’s interventionist theory of causation. In particular, I show that in certain circumstances interventionism leads to absurd consequences. I then discuss several possible modifications to avoid these problems and show that the causal notions within the versions of interventionism one gets by accepting the most promising of these modifications fall together with their counterparts within the theory of causal Bayes nets under suitable conditions.


Books

causalnets[b.1] Causal nets, interventionism, and mechanisms: Philosophical foundations and applications
Synthese Library
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    This monograph looks at causal nets from a philosophical point of view. The author shows that one can build a general philosophical theory of causation on the basis of the causal nets framework that can be fruitfully used to shed new light on philosophical issues. Coverage includes both a theoretical as well as application-oriented approach to the subject.
    The author first counters David Hume’s challenge about whether causation is something ontologically real. The idea behind this is that good metaphysical concepts should behave analogously to good theoretical concepts in scientific theories. In the process, the author offers support for the theory of causal nets as indeed being a correct theory of causation.
    Next, the book offers an application-oriented approach to the subject. The author shows that causal nets can investigate philosophical issues related to causation. He does this by means of two exemplary applications. The first consists of an evaluation of Jim Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation. The second offers a contribution to the new mechanist debate.
    Introductory chapters outline all the formal basics required. This helps make the book useful for those who are not familiar with causal nets, but interested in causation or in tools for the investigation of philosophical issues related to causation.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2017). Causal nets, interventionism, and mechanisms: Philosophical foundations and applications. Synthese Library 381. Cham: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-49908-6


Peer-Reviewed Articles

[a.15] Causal exclusion without physical completeness and no overdetermination
Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Hitchcock (2012) demonstrated that the validity of causal exclusion arguments as well as the plausibility of several of their premises hinges on the specific theory of causation endorsed. In this paper I show that the validity of causal exclusion arguments if represented within the theory of causal Bayes nets the way Gebharter (2015) suggests actually requires much weaker premises than the ones which are typically assumed. In particular, neither completeness of the physical domain nor the no overdetermination assumption is required.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2017). Causal exclusion without physical completeness and no overdetermination. Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação, 10, 3-14.

[a.14] A causal Bayesian network model of disease progression mechanisms in chronic myeloid leukemia
Journal of Theoretical Biology
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Chronic myeloid leukemia (CML) is a cancer of the hematopoietic system initiated by a single genetic mutation which results in the oncogenic fusion protein Bcr-Abl. Untreated, patients pass through different phases of the disease beginning with the rather asymptomatic chronic phase and ultimately culminating into blast crisis, an acute leukemia resembling phase with a very high mortality. Although many processes underlying the chronic phase are well understood, the exact mechanisms of disease progression to blast crisis are not yet revealed. In this paper we develop a mathematical model of CML based on causal Bayesian networks in order to study possible disease progression mechanisms. Our results indicate that an increase of Bcr-Abl levels alone is not sufficient to explain the phenotype of blast crisis and that secondary changes such as additional mutations are necessary to explain disease progression and the poor therapy response of patients in blast crisis.
Citation Information
    Koch, D., Eisinger, R., & Gebharter, A. (2017). A causal Bayesian network model of disease progression mechanisms in chronic myeloid leukemia. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 433, 94-105. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.08.023

[a.13] Constitutive relevance, mutual manipulability, and fat-handedness
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    The first part of this paper argues that if Craver’s ([2007a], [2007b]) popular mutual manipulability account (MM) of mechanistic constitution is embedded within Woodward’s ([2003]) interventionist theory of causation—for which it is explicitly designed—it either undermines the mechanistic research paradigm by entailing that there do not exist relationships of constitutive relevance or it gives rise to the unwanted consequence that constitution is a form of causation. The second part shows how Woodward’s theory can be adapted in such a way that (MM) neither undermines the mechanistic paradigm nor reduces constitution to causation. However, it turns out that this modified theoretical embedding of (MM) makes it impossible to produce empirical evidence for constitutive relations. The paper ends by suggesting an additional criterion, the fat-handedness criterion, which, when combined with (MM), generates indirect empirical evidence for constitutive relevance.
Citation Information
    Baumgartner, M., & Gebharter, A. (2016). Constitutive relevance, mutual manipulability, and fat-handedness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 67(3), 731-756. doi:10.1093/bjps/axv003

[a.12] Another problem with RBN models of mechanisms
Theoria — An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Casini, Illari, Russo, and Williamson (2011) suggest to model mechanisms by means of recursive Bayesian networks (RBNs) and Clarke, Leuridan, and Williamson (2014) extend their modelling approach to mechanisms featuring causal feedback. One of the main selling points of the RBN approach should be that it provides answers to questions concerning manipulation and control. In this paper I demonstrate that the method to compute the effects of interventions the authors mentioned endorse leads to absurd results under the additional assumption of faithfulness, which can be expected to hold for many RBN models of mechanisms.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2016). Another problem with RBN models of mechanisms. Theoria – An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 31(2), 177-188. doi:10.1387/theoria.14502

[a.11] Uncovering constitutive relevance relations in mechanisms
Philosophical Studies
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In this paper I argue that constitutive relevance relations in mechanisms behave like a special kind of causal relation in at least one important respect: Under suitable circumstances constitutive relevance relations produce the Markov factorization. Based on this observation one may wonder whether standard methods for causal discovery could be fruitfully applied to uncover constitutive relevance relations. This paper is intended as a first step into this new area of philosophical research. I investigate to what extent the PC algorithm, originally developed for causal search, can be used for constitutive relevance discovery. I also discuss possible objections and certain limitations of a constitutive relevance discovery procedure based on PC.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2016). Uncovering constitutive relevance relations in mechanisms. Philosophical Studies. Advance online publication. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0803-3

[a.10] A modeling approach for mechanisms featuring causal cycles
Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Mechanisms play an important role in many sciences when it comes to questions concerning explanation, prediction, and control. Answering such questions in a quantitative way requires a formal represention of mechanisms. Gebharter (2014) suggests to represent mechanisms by means of one or more causal arrows of an acyclic causal net. In this paper we show how this approach can be extended in such a way that it can also be fruitfully applied to mechanisms featuring causal feedback.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2016). A modelling approach for mechanisms featuring causal cycles. Philosophy of Science, 83(5), 934-945. doi:10.1086/687876

[a.9] Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    We start this paper by arguing that causality should, in analogy with force in Newtonian physics, be understood as a theoretical concept that is not explicated by a single definition, but by the axioms of a theory. Such an understanding of causality implicitly underlies the well-known theory of causal (Bayes) nets (TCN) and has been explicitly promoted by Glymour (Br J Philos Sci 55:779–790, 2004). In this paper we investigate the explanatory warrant and empirical content of TCN. We sketch how the assumption of directed cause-effect relations can be philosophically justified by an inference to the best explanation. We then ask whether the explanations provided by TCN are merely post-facto or have independently testable empirical content. To answer this question we develop a fine-grained axiomatization of TCN, including a distinction of different kinds of faithfulness. A number of theorems show that although the core axioms of TCN are empirically empty, extended versions of TCN have successively increasing empirical content.
Citation Information
    Schurz, G., & Gebharter, A. (2016). Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets. Synthese, 193(4), 1073–1103. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0630-z

 
[a.8] Causal exclusion and causal Bayes nets
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward’s (2003) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2015). Causal exclusion and causal Bayes nets. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Advance online publication. doi:10.1111/phpr.12247

[a.7] A formal framework for representing mechanisms?
Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In this paper I tackle the question of how mechanisms can be represented within a causal graph framework. I begin with a few words on mechanisms and some of their characteristic properties. I then concentrate on how one of these characteristic properties, viz. the hierarchic order of mechanisms (mechanisms frequently consist of several submechanisms), can be represented within a causal graph framework. I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Casini, Illari, Russo, & Williamson (2011) and demonstrate on an example that their formalism, though nicely capturing the hierarchic order of mechanisms, does not support two important features of nested mechanisms: (i) a mechanism’s submechanisms are typically causally interacting with other parts of said mechanism, and (ii) intervening in some of a mechanism’s parts should have some influence on the phenomena the mechanism as a whole brings about. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach capable of taking properties (i) and (ii) into account and demonstrate this on the above-mentioned exemplary mechanism.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2014). A formal framework for representing mechanisms? Philosophy of Science, 81(1), 138–153. doi:10.1086/674206

[a.6] Causal graphs and biological mechanisms
Explanation in the special sciences: The case of biology and history; Synthese Library
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Modeling mechanisms is central to the biological sciences – for purposes of explanation, prediction, extrapolation, and manipulation. A closer look at the philosophical literature reveals that mechanisms are predominantly modeled in a purely qualitative way. That is, mechanistic models are conceived of as representing how certain entities and activities are spatially and temporally organized so that they bring about the behavior of the mechanism in question. Although this adequately characterizes how mechanisms are represented in biology textbooks, contemporary biological research practice shows the need for quantitative, probabilistic models of mechanisms, too. In this paper we argue that the formal framework of causal graph theory is well-suited to provide us with models of biological mechanisms that incorporate quantitative and probabilistic information. On the basis of an example from contemporary biological practice, namely feedback regulation of fatty acid biosynthesis in Brassica napus, we show that causal graph theoretical models can account for feedback as well as for the multi-level character of mechanisms. However, we do not claim that causal graph theoretical representations of mechanisms are advantageous in all respects and should replace common qualitative models. Rather, we endorse the more balanced view that causal graph theoretical models of mechanisms are useful for some purposes, while being insufficient for others.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Kaiser M. I. (2014). Causal graphs and biological mechanisms. In M. I. Kaiser, O. Scholz, D. Plenge, & A. Hüttemann (Eds.), Explanation in the special sciences: The case of biology and history (pp. 55–85). Synthese Library 367. Dordrecht: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-7563-3_3

[a.5] How Occam’s razor provides a neat definition of direct causation
Proceedings of the UAI workshop Causal Inference: Learning and Prediction
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In this paper we show that the application of Occam’s razor to the theory of causal Bayes nets gives us a neat definition of direct causation. In particular we show that Occam’s razor implies Woodward’s (2003) definition of direct causation, provided suitable intervention variables exist and the causal Markov condition (CMC) is satisfied. We also show how Occam’s razor can account for direct causal relationships Woodward style when only stochastic intervention variables are available.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2014). How Occam’s razor provides a neat definition of direct causation. In J. M. Mooij, D. Janzing, J. Peters, T. Claassen, & A. Hyttinen (Eds.), Proceedings of the UAI workshop Causal Inference: Learning and Prediction. Retrieved from http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1274/uai2014ci_paper1.pdf

[a.4] Solving the flagpole problem
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In this paper I demonstrate that the causal structure of flagpole-like systems can be determined by application of causal graph theory. Additional information about the ordering of events in time or about how parameters of the systems of interest can be manipulated is not needed.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2013). Solving the flagpole problem. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 44(1), 63–67. doi:10.1007/s10838-013-9208-6

 
[a.3] The argument from hallucination in the light of modernformal philosophy
Tagungsband der Nachwuchstagungen fuer Junge Philosophie in Darmstadt
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Mirnig, A. G. (2011). The argument from hallucination in the light of modern formal philosophy. In S. Alpsancar, & K. Denker (Eds.), Tagungsband der Nachwuchstagungen fuer Junge Philosophie in Darmstadt (pp. 85–96). Marburg: Tectum.

[a.2] Disjunctivism: An answer to two pseudo problems?
Conceptus
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    Ever since it was discovered that hallucinations and illusions are not all that compatible with our natural view of the relation between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, according to which we always perceive the object itself (or, as most epistemologists prefer to say, we perceive it directly), the philosophical position of Direct (or Naïve) Realism which is meant to be the epistemological equivalent of this view, has begun to falter. To express these problems more explicitly, the argument from hallucination and the argument from illusion were created and brought direct realists in dire need of explaining how phenomenons such as hallucinations and illusions could possibly go together with their position. One of the main direct (or naïve) realists’ responses to these arguments is Disjunctivism, a position that, while being able to efficiently deal with both arguments, is subject to quite a few problems in its postulations as well. The intuitive plausibility of both arguments seems to have led many a philosopher to take their validity for granted. Because of this, it will be attempted to give an accurate and adequate reformulation of both arguments in this paper to find out whether their impact on the philosophy of perception is justified in the first place.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Mirnig, A. G. (2010). Disjunctivism: An answer to two pseudo problems? Conceptus, 39(95), 61–84. doi:10.1515/cpt-2010-9503

[a.1] From a mereotopological point of view: Putting the scientific magnifying glass on Kant’s first antinomy
KRITERION — Journal of Philosophy
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant presents four antinomies. In his attempt to solve the first of these antinomies he examines and analyzes “thesis” and “antithesis” more thoroughly and employs the terms ‘part’, ‘whole’ and ‘boundary’ in his argumentation for their validity. According to Kant, the whole problem surrounding the antinomy was caused by applying the concept of the world to nature and then using both terms interchangeably. While interesting, this solution is still not that much more than a well thought out idea if it does not also include an adequate formal explication. Since the aforementioned terms all have counterparts in modern mereotopology, a discipline that has seen significant progress in recent times, we will apply these concepts to Kant’s analysis in an attempt to evaluate Kant’s solution in light of modern analytic philosophy.
Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Mirnig, A. G. (2010). From a mereotopological point of view: Putting the scientific magnifying glass on Kant’s first antinomy. KRITERION — Journal of Philosophy, 23(1), 64–85.


Edited Volumes

[e.5] Logical perspectives on science and cognition — the philosophy of Gerhard Schurz
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Contributions

    ● TBA

Citation Information
    Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., Gebharter, A., Brössel, P., & Werning, M. (in preparation). Logical perspectives on science and cognition — the philosophy of Gerhard Schurz [Special issue]. Synthese.

[e.4] Selected papers of the Second Conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP), Düsseldorf, March 8–11, 2016
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Contributions

    ● Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter, & Gerhard Schurz: Philosophy of science between the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities

    ● Alexander Rosenberg: Why social science is biological science

    ● Gila Sher: Truth and scientific change

    ● Christian Wallmann: A Bayesian solution to the conflict of narrowness and precision in direct inference

    ● Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla: Optimization in a synchronized prediction Setting

    ● Alexander Christian: On the suppression of medical evidence

    ● Markus Schrenk: The emergence of better best system laws

    ● Carsten Held: Ceteris-paribus qualifiers

    ● Beate Krickel: Making sense of interlevel causation in mechanisms from a metaphysical perspective

    ● Stathis Psillos: Induction and natural necessities

Citation Information
    Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (forthcoming). Selected papers of the Second Conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP), Düsseldorf, March 8–11, 2016 [Special issue]. Journal for General Philosophy of Science.

[e.3] Causation, probability, and truth — the philosophy of Clark Glymour
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Contributions

    ● Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz: Introduction to the special issue “Causation, probability, and truth – the philosophy of Clark Glymour”

    ● Jiji Zhang & Peter Spirtes: The three faces of faithfulness

    ● Frederick Eberhardt: Green and grue causal variables

    ● James Woodward: The problem of variable choice

    ● Gerhard Schurz & Alexander Gebharter: Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets

    ● Gerhard Schurz & Alexander Gebharter: Erratum to: Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets

    ● York Hagmayer: Causal Bayes nets as psychological theories of causal reasoning – evidence from psychological research

    ● Paul Näger: The causal problem of entanglement

    ● Christopher Hitchcock: Conditioning, intervening, and decision

    ● Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: Of brains and planets: On a causal criterion for mind-brain identities

    ● Kevin Kelly, Konstantin Genin, & Hanti Lin: Realism, rhetoric and reliability

    ● Sylvia Wenmackers & Jan-Willem Romeijn: New theory about old evidence: A framework for open-minded Bayesianism

    ● Clark Glymour: Clark Glymour’s responses to the contributions to the Synthese special issue “Causation, probability, and truth – the philosophy of Clark Glymour”

Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (Eds.). (2016). Causation, probability, and truth – the philosophy of Clark Glymour [Special issue]. Synthese, 193(4).

[e.2] Explanation, causality, and unification
Theoria — An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Contributions

    ● Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz: Editors’ introduction

    ● Stathis Psillos: Regularities, natural patterns and laws of nature

    ● Andreas Hüttemann: Scientific practice and necessary connections

    ● Erik Weber & Merel Lefevere: The role of explanations in micro-explanations of physical laws

    ● Gerhard Schurz: Unification and explanation: Explanation as a prototype concept. A reply to Weber and van Dyck, Gijsbers, and de Regt

    ● Victor Gijsbers: Unification as a measure of natural classification

Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (Eds.). (2014). Explanation, causality, and unification [Monographic section]. Theoria — An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 29(1), 3–82.

[e.1] Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2010
KRITERION — Journal of Philosophy
[final publication] [draft version]

Contributions

    ● The organization committee: Figures and facts

    ● Moritz Cordes: Rudolf Carnaps verschiedene Scheinproblemkonzeptionen

    ● Magdalena Eckes: Elektronen, Amseln, Finken. Wovon können unsere nicht-inferenziellen Beobachtungsüberzeugungen handeln?

    ● Ludwig J. Jaskolla: On storms in teacups: Limitations of 3D-4D-equivalence

    ● Max Seeger: A critique of the incentives argument from inequality

    ● Tim Seuchter: A new approach to the grounding of abstract concepts

    ● Christian Wallmann: Theorie der Konsequenzoperationen und Grundbegriffe der Logik

Citation Information
    Anglberger, A. J. J., Feldbacher, C. J., Gebharter, A., & Gugerell, S. H. (Eds.). (2011). Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2010 [Special issue]. KRITERION — Journal of Philosophy, 25(1).


Other Publications

[o.15] The Second International Conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP.2016), 8–11 March 2016
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Christian, A., Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., & Gebharter, A. (2017). The Second International Conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP.2016), 8-11 March 2016 [Conference report]. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 48(2), 289–291. doi:10.1007/s10838-016-9358-4

[o.14] Philosophy of science between the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2017). Philosophy of science between the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities [Introduction]. Journal for General Philosophy of Science. Advance online publication. doi:10.1007/s10838-017-9378-8

[o.13] Spotlight on the Düsseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS)
EPSA Newsletter
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information

[o.12] Introduction to the special issue “Causation, probability,and truth — the philosophy of Clark Glymour”
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2016). Introduction to the special issue “Causation, probability, and truth — the philosophy of Clark Glymour” [Introduction]. Synthese, 193(4), 1007–1010. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-1007-7

[o.11] Erratum to: Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatorywarrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets
Synthese
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Schurz, G., & Gebharter, A. (2016). Erratum to: Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets [Erratum]. Synthese, 193(4), 1105–1106. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1019-y.

[o.10] European Philosophy of Science Association, 23–26 September
The Reasoner
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Christian, A., Feldbacher, C. J., Gebharter, A., & Retzlaff, N. (2015). European Philosophy of Science Association, 23-26 September [Conference report]. The Reasoner, 9(11), 95.

[o.9] Erratum to: Solving the flagpole problem
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Gebharter, A. (2015). Erratum to: Solving the flagpole problem [Erratum]. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 46(2), 245. doi:10.1007/s10838-015-9311-y

[o.8] Addendum to: A formal framework for representing mechanisms?
PhilPapers.org
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information

[o.7] Editors’ introduction
Theoria — An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2014). Editors’ introduction [Introduction]. Theoria — An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 29(1), 5–7. doi:10.1387/theoria.10708

[o.6] Philosophy of science in Germany, 1992–2012: Survey-based overview and quantitative analysis
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
[final publication] [draft version]

Abstract
    An overview of the German philosophy of science community is given for the years 1992 to 2012, based on a survey, at which 159 philosophers of science in Germany participated. To this end, the institutional background of the German philosophy of science community is examined in terms of journals, centers, and associations. Furthermore, a qualitative description and a quantitative analysis of our survey results are presented. Quantitative estimates are given for: (a) academic positions, (b) research foci, (c) philosophers’ of science most important publications, and (d) externally funded projects, where for (c) all survey participants had indicated their five most important publications in philosophy of science. In addition, the survey results for (a)-(c) are also qualitatively described, as they are interesting in their own right. With respect to (a), we estimated the gender distribution among academic positions. Concerning (c), we quantified philosophers’ of science preference for (i) journals and publishers, (ii) publication format, (iii) language, and (iv) coauthorship for their most important publications. With regard to research projects, we determined their (i) prevalence, (ii) length, and (iii) trend (an increase in number?) and well as their most frequent (iv) research foci and (v) funding organizations. We also distinguished between German-based and non-German-based journals, publishers, and funding institutions, making it thereby possible to evaluate the involvement of the German philosophy of science community in the international research landscape. Finally, we discuss some implications of our findings.
Citation Information
    Unterhuber, M., Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2014). Philosophy of science in Germany, 1992–2012: Survey-based overview and quantitative analysis. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 45(1, suppl.), 71–160. doi:10.1007/s10838-014-9270-8

[o.5] Wissenschaft und menschliche Werte
Werte in den Wissenschaften: Neue Ansätze zum Werturteilsstreit
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Hempel, C. G. (2013). Wissenschaft und menschliche Werte (A. Gebharter, Trans.). In G. Schurz, & M. Carrier (Eds.), Werte in den Wissenschaften: Neue Ansätze zum Werturteilsstreit (pp. 118–140). Berlin: Suhrkamp. (Original work published 1965).

[o.4] The philosophy of Clark Glymour, 13–15 June
The Reasoner
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Unterhuber, M., & Gebharter, A. (2013). The philosophy of Clark Glymour, 13–15 June [Conference report]. The Reasoner, 7(9), 109.

[o.3] Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2011
KRITERION — Journal of Philosophy
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Anglberger, A. J. J., Feldbacher, C. J., Gebharter, A., & Gugerell, S. H. (2012). Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2011 [Conference report]. KRITERION — Journal of Philosophy, 26(1), 104–109.

[o.2] For a better understanding of causality
Metascience
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2012). For a better understanding of causality [Review of the book Causality in the sciences, by P. M. K. Illari, F. Russo, & J. Williamson (Eds.)]. Metascience, 21(3), 643–648. doi:10.1007/s11016-012-9648-3

[o.1] Explanation, causality, and unification, 11–12 November
The Reasoner
[final publication] [draft version]

Citation Information
    Schurz, G., & Gebharter, A. (2012). Explanation, causality, and unification, 11–12 November [Conference report]. The Reasoner, 6(1), 9–10.